Study level
- Master of Philosophy
Faculty/School
Faculty of Business and Law
Topic status
We're looking for students to study this topic.
Supervisors
- Position
- Professor
- Division / Faculty
- Faculty of Business & Law
- Position
- Senior Lecturer
- Division / Faculty
- Faculty of Business & Law
Overview
Since the last decade, there have been intense debates over whether executive compensation contracts are set optimally for interest alignment between management and shareholders. As Jensen and Murphy (2010) noted, the real problem of compensation is 'not how much you pay, but how'. While there is an agreement that performance-based pay can influence corporate investment decisions, the evidence is less clear on how and to what extent such a link is established. The real interest of this study is to examine the design of compensation contracts that motivates CEOs to make more efficient capital allocation decisions.
Contact
Contact the supervisor for more information.